Houthis seize Bab al-Mandeb, ending Saudi Arabia's regional primacy
By Klaus Berger · Reporting from Frankfurt ·
For the better part of a decade, Mohammed bin Salman has attempted to trade the Kingdom’s traditional role as a regional security guarantor for a glossy, diversified future.
For the better part of a decade, Mohammed bin Salman has attempted to trade the Kingdom’s traditional role as a regional security guarantor for a glossy, diversified future. He wanted a Saudi Arabia defined by neon cities and investment portfolios, not by the grinding attrition of a proxy war in the Yemeni highlands. But geography is a stubborn creditor, and the bill has finally come due.
The recent seizure of the port city of Mocha and the strategic island of Mayyun by the Houthis is not merely a tactical setback; it is a systemic failure. As reported by Al Jazeera, the Houthis now control the Bab al-Mandeb strait, positioning themselves a mere 20 kilometres from the African coast. When a non-state actor controls a chokepoint that handles 12% of global trade—including 11% of maritime oil—the "economic transformation" the Crown Prince craves becomes a fantasy. You cannot build a futuristic economy on a foundation of maritime instability.
Geography Does Not Negotiate
The numbers are as severe as the strategic reality. According to Al Jazeera, shipping volume through the Red Sea plummeted by over 50% between 2023 and 2025. Egypt, a critical regional pillar, has watched $7 billion in Suez Canal revenues vanish. This is the result of a calculated asymmetric strategy. By targeting Saudi-linked ships and seizing the Bab al-Mandeb, the Houthis have effectively weaponized the map.
Riyadh’s predicament is compounded by a catastrophic failure of risk management. While the United States and Israel are locked in a war with Iran that began on February 28, 2026, the naval assets required to secure the Red Sea have been pivoted toward the Strait of Hormuz. This has created a security vacuum that the Houthis were only too happy to fill. We are seeing the resurgence of Somali piracy and a total collapse of the regional order, a direct consequence of the "latency and inactivity" noted by maritime expert Alexandru Cristian Hudisteanu.
This is the same pattern of overextension we saw during Operation Decisive Storm in 2015, where Saudi Arabia entered a conflict believing that superior firepower could substitute for a political settlement. They learned nothing. The Yemeni Civil War of 2021 proved that the Houthis could endure; the current crisis proves they can win.
The High Cost of Presidential Optimism
The Kingdom’s reliance on the personal rapport between Mohammed bin Salman and Donald Trump is a textbook example of moral hazard. Politico reports that Trump has dismissed the crisis with the breezy assertion that "everything’s going to work out fine and dandy." Such rhetoric is an insult to the balance sheet.
While the White House may be "not enthusiastic" about getting involved, the reality on the ground is a series of coordinated strikes. Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline—the vital artery rerouting 5 million barrels of oil per day to avoid the Iranian blockade of Hormuz—has been crippled by drones from Iraq. Kpler data reveals the brutality of this disruption: Saudi oil exports to Asia crashed from 3.4 million barrels a day in June to a pathetic 128,000 in August.
The Saudi foreign ministry maintains that it "reserves its right to take all necessary measures," but this is the language of a state that has run out of moves. They are trapped between a US administration that offers friendship but no airstrikes, and a Houthi militia that has evolved from a local insurgency into a regional maritime power. Even the multinational efforts of Operation Prosperity Guardian in 2024 were a mere bandage on a severed artery.
The Architecture of a Strategic Collapse
To understand the gravity of this moment, one must look to the Fall of Singapore in 1942. The British Empire viewed Singapore as an impregnable fortress, the cornerstone of their East Asian security architecture. They relied on the prestige of their empire and the assumption that no asymmetric force could challenge their naval dominance. When the Japanese seized that chokepoint, the entire regional security framework didn't just bend; it collapsed.
The seizure of the Bab al-Mandeb is the modern equivalent. Saudi Arabia believed its wealth and its alliance with the US created a shield of invulnerability. They ignored the warnings that a currency of "good friendships" cannot buy security when the enemy controls the physical gates of trade. Like the British in 1942, Riyadh is discovering that a strategic chokepoint, once lost, cannot be recovered through diplomacy or "intelligence advisers."
The Houthis are no longer just fighting for a piece of Yemen; they are exercising a veto over the Kingdom’s solvency. As CNN notes, some analysts suggest the Kingdom may be forced into a "very expensive submission." In the cold language of the ordoliberals, this is a bankruptcy of strategy.
Saudi Arabia is now facing a binary choice: enter a full-scale war as a direct combatant alongside the US and Israel—a move that would invite total devastation of its remaining infrastructure—or accept a dictated peace that validates the Houthi blockade. Given the current state of their interceptor missile stocks and the hesitation in Washington, the "choice" is an illusion. Riyadh is not negotiating; it is surrendering its regional primacy.